Tytti Er?st?: ¡°Nobody Can Take Nuclear Threats Lightly¡±
Dr Tytti Er?st? is a Senior Researcher in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), specializing in nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. In this Expert Take interview, Dr Er?st? gives her insights on whether nuclear deterrence can keep the world safe.
Question: For decades, the threat of nuclear retaliation has influenced how countries interact and make military decisions. This is referred to as nuclear deterrence. Does deterrence work, and do countries still rely on it today?
Tytti Er?st?: While there is a lot of talk about ¡°limited¡± nuclear threats today, nuclear deterrence is ultimately based on the threat of destroying one¡¯s adversary. Nuclear weapons can literally wipe out entire civilizations¡ªand, in the case of Russian and US arsenals, they can destroy the entire planet. Nobody in their right mind can take threats to use such weapons of mass destruction lightly, and in this sense nuclear deterrence can be seen to ¡°work.¡±
The nine [Please see Footnote 1] nuclear-armed states and allied countries under extended nuclear deterrence arrangements believe that nuclear deterrence works by promoting military restraint in their adversaries. At the same time, they tend to ignore the risks inherent in nuclear deterrence.
Question: What are the risks? Why does nuclear deterrence fail to prevent escalation in modern conflicts?
Tytti Er?st?: The leaders of nuclear-armed states cannot be trusted to always act rationally and their judgement might be impaired in crisis situations¡ªit only takes one misguided decision by a leader of a nuclear-armed state for deterrence to fail catastrophically. There are several historical examples where nuclear weapons were close to being used because of technical or human error.
Nuclear deterrence has not been that effective in deterring attacks with conventional weapons. For example, both nuclear-armed Israel and Russia have been targeted with conventional weapons in recent years. At the same time, the weakening taboo on attacks against nuclear-armed states¡¯ strategic assets - notably Russia¡¯s heavy bombers and early warning radars - raises new kinds of nuclear escalation risks.
Question: The possessors of the world's two largest nuclear arsenals have gradually moved away from major arms-control agreements. In February 2026, treaty expired without a successor arrangement. What does the end of the last treaty limiting US and Russian strategic arsenals mean for nuclear risks around the world?
Tytti Er?st?: The USA and Russia still have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world. The existential risks posed by these weapons were there even before the New START expiry. However, the treaty was part of a process that sought to move towards further reducing the number of these weapons, while also helping to create transparency and build predictability in the bilateral strategic relationship. That process has been deadlocked already since 2010 and now, after New START expiry, there are no verifiable limits on US and Russian arsenals¡ªnor a shared understanding on the need to continue this process. Eventually, the loss of transparency combined with worst-case assumptions related to conflict dynamics and technological developments might contribute to greater strategic instability, meaning both arms racing and a heightened risk of nuclear war.
Question: SIPRI estimates that there are about 12,200 nuclear warheads worldwide, with roughly 9,700 in military stockpiles and about 4,000 deployed with missiles and aircraft. Given this situation, what can the international community realistically do now to reduce nuclear risks and keep the goal of disarmament?
Tytti Er?st?: Five of the nine nuclear armed states have committed to moving towards disarmament under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Other NPT states parties can maintain the pressure on them to live up to their commitments, even if such efforts have been largely unsuccessful in recent years. Especially given the resulting legitimacy crisis within the NPT , the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has a key role in upholding the norm against nuclear weapons today. Those non-nuclear armed states who are part of conflict dynamics with nuclear-armed states¡ªnotably European NATO allies¡ªshould also take responsibility for reducing regional escalation risks and critically assess their own involvement in nuclear deterrence practices.
Footnote 1 This figure reflects SIPRI¡¯s assessment of states considered to possess nuclear weapons.
